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Will Bad Times Get Worse?
The Problems With Ohio's Bad Time Statute
"Bad time? It's a goodphrase. For if the Ohio Legislature is
successful in permitting jailers to determine how long prisoners
remain in jail, it is a bad time for us all indeed. ,,
INTRODUCTION
November 4, 1997 marked the day that Ohio convicted
Samuel White for receiving stolen property. He was subsequently
sentenced to a supposedly definite term of sixteen months to the
Noble Correctional Institution in Ohio.2 During his sixteen-month
term, White was charged twice with assault. The Rules Infraction
Board (RIB) heard the charges and recommended that his definite
sentence be extended. When the Parole Board considered the RIB's
recommendation, they extended his sixteen-month sentence for an
additional 120 days.3 Samuel White is not the only prisoner who is
being held past the original point of his presumably definite sentence
in Ohio.4 Since its enactment on July 1, 1996, 5 262 prisoners have
been subjected to Ohio's Bad Time statute and forced to remain in
prison past their given release date.
6
The Ohio legislature enacted Revised Code 2967.11, in order
to increase the amount of time that prisoners actually spend in jail by
increasing a prisoner's sentence for violations he commits while in
prison.7 The added time in jail is known as "Bad Time". 8 Bad Time
is the result of truth in sentencing legislation that has started to sweep
1 Ohio v. Spikes, 717 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)(O'Neil, J.,
dissenting).
2 See White v. Konteh, No. 99-T-0020, 1999 WL 587976 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.
March 23, 1999).3
1d.
4 See Alan Johnson, Bad Time is Bad Law, the Ohio Supreme Court Ruled
Yesterday, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 15, 2000, at 7C.
5 See Editorial & Comment, Truth in Sentencing Major Rewrite of Criminal




7 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.11 (West 1999); see also OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 5120-9-091 (1999).
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.01(B) (West 1999).
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the country. 9 Unfortunately, the Bad Time statute has failed to
preserve some of the constitutional rights guaranteed to prisoners.' 0
Finally, after four years of the Parole Board extending prisoner's
sentences, the Ohio Supreme Court has struck down the Bad Time
Statute, stating that it violates Ohio's notions of Separation of
Powers. 
1
Part one will describe the evolution of Ohio's Criminal Justice
System, whicht started as an indeterminate system whereby prisoners
were sentenced to ranges of time with the possibility of parole. Then,
the system became determinate so that the sentences were fixed and
definite. Subsequently, Ohio reverted back to an indeterminate
system; however, in 1982, Ohio began to return to a determinate
system. 12 With the enactment of the Bad Time Statute, prisoners
serve fixed sentences with the threat of an increase in their term.' 3 A
full description of the Bad Time statute is also provided in Part two in
order to put the remainder of this Note into context.'
4
Part three discusses the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling that the
statute violates Ohio's doctrine of Separation of Powers.15 The Parole
Board, the Institutional Head, and the Rules Infraction Board
customarily take away the rights of the judiciary acting as judge and
jury in deciding what should become of a prisoner after an alleged
violation of the rules occurs. 16  Since adding time to a prisoner's
9 David Diroll, Ohio Adopts Determinate Sentencing, in SENTENCING REFORM
IN OVERCROWDED TIMES: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 110, 111 (Michael Tonry et al.
eds., 1997).
1o See Justin Brooks, The Politics of Prison, 77 MICH. B.J. 154 (1998). The
new program in Michigan eliminated the rewards for good behavior in exchange for
disciplinary credits. Id. Furthermore, prisoners are not eligible for parole until after they
have served the minimum sentence and any bad time that may be added. Id.
1 See State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 729 N.E.2d 359 (Ohio 2000).
12 David Lore, Revamping of Parole is Proposed; 'Bad Time' Penalty
Favored Over 'Good Time'Reward, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, March 19, 1992, at IA.
13 See discussion infra Part I (discussing how Ohio's criminal justice system
has changed).
14 See discussion infra Part II.
"5 See Bray, 729 N.E.2d 359.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
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sentence can only result from a criminal prosecution, it is not the role
of an executive agency to act as a judicial body. 
17
The Bad Time statute not only violates Ohio's Constitution,
but also the United States Constitution. Part four analyzes how a
prisoner's Due Process rights are violated by the imposition of Bad
Time. In effect, the statute deprives a prisoner of the liberty that a
free person enjoys when not incarcerated. The Fifth 18 and the
Fourteenth 19 Amendments require that a person's liberty shall not be
deprived without Due Process of law. Due Process can be denied
when Bad Time is considered part of the original sentence and not as
punishment for a new and separate offense.20  Prisoners should be
entitled to a hearing before an impartial tribunal; a higher standard of
proof than clear and convincing evidence; and an ongoing right to an
attorney while incarcerated. 1
I. BACKGROUND
During the 1880's, Ohio enacted its first parole laws pursuant
to the "idealistic mood of American penology., 22 Parole was seen as
a way to reform prisoners and better society.23 However, the idealistic
mood changed during Prohibition because crime was on the rise and
more people were being sent to jail.24 In 1921, the Ohio Legislature
eliminated the parole board and instead introduced a determinate
system where prisoners were sentenced to fixed terms. 25 As a result
17 See discussion infra Part III (emphasizing that the role of the Parole Board
is not to levy sanctions on prisoners).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20 See discussion infra Part IV. B. 1.
21 See discussion infra Part IV (illustrating that prisoners do maintain some
rights in prison; especially, the right to due process of law).
22 David Lore, Parole Board Ohio's Prison Woes Point to Abolishment,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 21, 1992, at IB (describing how Ohio was a leader in the
parole movement).
23 CLEMENS BARTOLLAS & MICHAEL BRASWELL, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 544 (1997).
24 See Lore, supra note 22, at lB.
25 See BARTOLLAS & BRASWELL, supra note 23, at 418. Determinate
sentencing may also include "mandatory sentences and presumptive sentences." Id.
20001 343
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [VOL. XVII
of determinate sentencing, prisons became overcrowded and in 1930,
a fire broke out in the Ohio Penitentiary killing 322 inmates.
26
In 1930, the Parole Board was reestablished and parole was
reintroduced into the penal system. The laws regarding sentencing
and parole remained largely unchanged 27 until the 1980's when the
legislature adopted three felony sentencing ranges.28 The legislature
began moving back toward a fixed-sentencing system, of the 1920's,
by "setting mandatory sentences for dangerous felons and fixed
sentences - not subject to parole - for third- and fourth-degree
felons. 29
Then in 1990, Ohio established a sentencing commission,
30
facilitating the transition from an indeterminate sentencing system to a
determinate one, and thus eliminated "good time" credits.31 Good
time credits were credits used to reward good behavior of prisoners.
If a prisoner collected enough of the credits, then the prisoner's
sentence was typically shortened by a certain number of days.32
Moreover, the Sentencing Commission tried to move away from a
Parole Board that would unilaterally decide to shorten a prisoner's
sentence to one that would evaluate a prisoner's conduct.33
Even though the law currently allows for parole, the Ohio
Parole Board has decreased the number of prisoners that are granted
parole. In 1992, the number of prisoners paroled from Ohio's jails fell
from fifty-three percent in the years 1976 to 1984, to forty percent
from 1985 to 1992. 34 Some believe that this drop is due to the Parole
Board's going "against its own guidelines in one of every four
26 See Lore, supra note 12, at 1 A; see also Lore, supra note 22, at lB.
27 A major change that Ohio did enact was modeled after the Model Penal
Code. However, the new criminal law did retain indeterminate sentencing. See
Sentencing Reform Proposals in Ohio, 6 Fed. Sent. R. 166 (Nov./Dec. 1993).
28 id.
29 Lore, supra note 12, at IA.
30 See 6 Fed. Sent. R. 166.
31 See Lore, supra note 12, at IA.
32 See Ellen F. Chayet, Correctional "Good Time" as a Means of Early
Release, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE OF CORRECTIONS 53
(Marilyn McShane, et al. eds., 1997).
33 See Lore, supra note 12, IA.
34 Lore, supra note 22, at IB (indicating that this drop is causing prison
overcrowding).
344
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decisions., 35  The Sentencing Commission was established to help
decide whether the Parole Board should once again be eliminated or
modified.36
This move, away from an indeterminate system, led legislators
to the idea of truth in sentencing and Bad Time. In January 1994,
Representative Ronald Suster introduced a new crime bill into Ohio's
General Assembly. 37  The bill had many changes including, "bad
time" - a system that allowed non-violent offenders an opportunity
to participate in local programs - as well as other measures ensuring
that violent offenders would serve a greater amount of their terms.38
The bill also included early release incentives for participation in
education, job training, and substance abuse programs.39 The House
passed the bill eighty-four to ten votes and subsequently, the bill was
sent to the Senate. 40 The Senate further modified the bill to include
the amount of time that the Parole Board could impose.4'
Finally, in mid-1995 Ohio's truth in sentencing bill was
passed, to the detriment of all prisoners.42
II. THE STATUTE
The Bad Time statute provides that if a prisoner commits a
violation43 while serving time in jail, his or her sentence can be
extended by fifteen, thirty, sixty, or ninety days. The amount of time
added for all violations cannot exceed one-half of the prisoner's
35 Id.; see also, Diroll, supra note 9, at 110.
36 Lore, supra note 22, at 1 B (stating that "the parole board has few friends");
see also 66 Fed. Sent. R. 166 (stating that the Parole Board would be used to monitor
prisoners after they were released from prison).
37 Alan Johnson & Cathy Candisky, House Oks Sentencing Changes,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 29, 1994, at 6E.38 See 6 Fed. Sent. R. 166.
39 See Johnson & Candisky, supra note 37, at 6E.40 See generally id.
41 Lee Leonard, Redone Sentencing Law Ok'd in House, Returned to Senate,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 29, 1995, at 4D.
42 See id.
43 § 2967.11 (A) (defining violation as "an act that is a criminal offense under
the law of this state or the United States, whether or not a person is prosecuted for the
commission of the offense").
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originally stated sentence. 4 The process to determine if time should
be added is a three-tiered system beginning with a Rules Infraction
Board ("RIB"), 45 which makes a preliminary finding; then passing to
the Institutional Head,46 who reviews the findings; and, lastly, the
Parole Board47 makes the final determination.
48
When a prisoner is accused of committing a violation, the
accusation is recorded in an institutional conduct report.49 Then, an
institutional investigator, who is appointed by the warden,
50
investigates the violation and reports to the RIB. The RIB is set up by
the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. 51  Once the
investigator approves the report, the prisoner receives a copy and is
informed that he or she may be subject to the imposition of bad time.
52
The RIB then holds a hearing to determine if there is enough evidence
to support a finding that the alleged violation occurred. At that
hearing, the prisoner has the opportunity to testify, cross-examine
witnesses, and defend himself or herself. 53 The RIB is then required
to report its findings, on whether there is evidence of a violation, to
the head of the institution where the prisoner is kept; otherwise, the
matter is terminated.5 4  In making the recommendation, the RIB is
" § 2967.11 (B) (meaning if a prisoner is originally sentenced to six years,
the maximum amount of aggregate Bad Time that can be imposed is three years).
45 See text accompanying notes 49-55.
46 See text accompanying notes 56-61.
47 See text accompanying notes 62-3.
41 See § 2967.11 (C); § 2967.11 (D); § 2967.11 (E).
49 § 5120-9-091 (B) 1).
50 § 5120-9-091 (A) (3).
51 § 2967.11 (C); see also, § 5120-9-091 (A) (4) (stating that the RIB is
picked by the warden and is made up of three staff members).
52 § 5120-9-091 (B) (3) (stating that no violation report can be reviewed by
the RIB without the approval of the investigator); see also, § 5120-9-091 (B) (4) (a).
53 See generally § 2967.11 (C) (RIB is also required to record the hearing).
14 § 2967.11 (C) (recommending also the amount of time the sentence should
be extended if evidence of the violation is found).
The board makes separate inquiries as to "(a) Whether there
is at least some evidence that the accused inmate has
committed a rule violation. (b) Whether there is at least
some evidence that the accused inmate has committed a bad
time violation. (c) Whether the evidence of a bad time
violation amounts to clear and convincing evidence. (d)
What disposition to make of any non-bad time rule
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supposed to consider several factors; such as: the amount of injury
caused to another inmate, whether the inmate's actions caused a threat
to the security of the prison, and the amount of property damage,
among others.
55
When the head of the institution receives the findings, he or
she reviews it within ten days, and determines whether a violation was
committed.56 If the institutional head determines that a violation was
committed by clear and convincing evidence, 57 then he or she makes a
recommendation to the parole board stating that a violation was
committed and also reports how much time should be added to the
violation. (e) How much bad time to recommend for any
bad time violation found to have been committed. (f)
Whether to impose any other disposition in addition to the
bad time recommendation." § 5120-9-091 (C) (3).
5 § 5120-9-091 (C) (4)
"Including but not limited to the following: (a) Whether the
inmate used, or threatened to use, a weapon in the
commission of the bad time violation; (b) The extent of
physical injury to another caused by the inmate as a result
of the bad time violation; (c) Whether the bad time
violation was committed during an escape or attempt to
escape from custody; (d) The extent to which the inmate's
actions constituted a threat to the security or orderly
operation of the institution; (e) The extent to which the
inmate posed a threat to the safety of any individual; (f) The
extent to which the bad time violation was a part of the
calculated plan or scheme; (g) The extent to which the bad
time violation was the result of, or reflected organized
criminal activity, or action by other individuals in concert
with the accused inmate; (h) The extent of property damage
or destruction caused by the inmate; (i).The disciplinary
record of the accused inmate; (j) The amount of bad time
previously imposed, the maximum amount of bad time that
could be imposed, and the inmate's current release date; (k)
Any other relevant factor.
56 § 2967.11 (D). The inmate is also supposed to receive a copy of the RIB's
findings. § 5120-9-091 (C) (6).
57 Clear and convincing evidence is the intermediate standard of proof
between the civil, on a preponderance of the evidence, and criminal, beyond a reasonable
doubt, standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). Clear and
convincing evidence is not a high enough standard of proof for increasing a prisoner's
sentence. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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prisoner's sentence. 58 If the Institutional Head decides that there is no
clear and convincing evidence of the violation, then the matter is
terminated. 59  The Institutional Head puts the recommendations in
writing for the Parole Board.60 The prisoner also receives a copy from
the Institutional Head and may appeal the recommendation.6'
Within 30 days of receiving the recommendations from both
RIB and from the head of the institution, the Parole Board reviews the
findings and makes its own determination of whether there is clear
and convincing evidence of the violation.62  If the Parole Board
5 § 2967.11 (D) (these findings are to be made within 10 days of receiving
the report from RIB).
'9 § 2967.11 (D). The warden is required to consider:
"(a) Has the inmate been properly charged with the rule
infractions for which he/she was convicted, including the
bad time violation? (b) Has there been any prejudicial
violation of procedural rights under the rules of the
Administrative Code? (c) Was the decision of the rules
infraction board supported by at least some factual evidence
in the record? (d) Is there clear and convincing evidence
that the inmate committed a bad time violation? (e) Is the
penalty or other disposition, assessed by the rules infraction
board for the non-bad time rule infractions authorized and
appropriate? (f) Should the inmate's stated prison term be
extended due to the bad time violation? (g) If so, would the
warden recommend an extension of thirty, sixty, or ninety
days? In making this determination the warden should
weigh the same factors as considered by the rules infraction
board as listed in paragraph (C) (4) of this rule." § 5120-9-
091 (D) (2).
60 § 5120-9-091 (D) (4).
61 Id. If the inmate is not happy about the recommendation, he or she can
appeal to the warden who again looks at his or her findings and those of the RIB. § 5120-
9-091 (D) (5).
6 § 2967.11 (E). The Institutional Head forwards the following documents
to the parole board to aid them in their decision:
(a) The warden's findings and recommendation; (b) The
findings and recommendation of the rules infraction board;
(c) The complete record of the disciplinary action for which
an imposition of bad time is sought; (d) A copy of the
inmate's overall rules infraction board offense record
(offense summary sheet); (e) A statement from the record
office showing the maximum amount by which the inmate's
stated prison term could be extended, the bad time
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determines that the prisoner's sentence should be extended, it
"considers the nature of the violation, other conduct of the prisoner
while in prison, and any other evidence relevant to maintaining order
in the institution" to decide how much time should be added.,
63
Special provisions are made if the alleged violation occurs less
than sixty days from the prisoner's scheduled release date.64 In that
case, the RIB and the Institutional Head are required to expedite their
procedures.65  Furthermore, this statute "does not preclude the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction from referring a criminal
offense allegedly committed by a prisoner to the appropriate
prosecuting authority . .,66 Thus, a prisoner could still be reported
to the proper authorities for a full adjudication in a court of law, but
the penalty would not be Bad Time, rather it would be whatever the
court may impose.67
previously accumulated to date, and the scheduled end of
the inmate's stated prison term. § 5120-9-091 (E) (1).
63 § 2967.11 (E) (requiring the Parole Board to make a decision within 60
days of the RIB hearing).
64 § 2967.11 (F).
65 Id. (the prisoner may be detained in the prison past his time pending the
outcome of the investigation, but not for more than 10 days).
66 § 2967.11 (G) (other sources of discipline are also not precluded by this
statute).
67 See id. What will not be discussed here is the threat of double jeopardy.
This threat comes from being sentenced to Bad Time by the parole board and then being
prosecuted by the courts. The Ohio Appellate Court for the fourth district has held that
imposing Bad Time can infringe on a prisoner's right not to be convicted for the same
crime twice. The court analyzed the problem saying,
[t]he major difficulty in the case at bar arises from the fact
that R.C. 2967.11 declares that bad time is imposed as part
of the inmate's original sentence. While the statute does
not specifically authorize a criminal prosecution in addition
to imposition of bad time, it is clear that the General
Assembly intended to make both penalties available for the
same offense. By declaring bad time to be part of the
inmate's original sentence, it appears that the General
Assembly was trying to avoid double jeopardy concerns.
See Ohio v. Nutt, No. 98CA36, 1999 WL 769951, at *5
(Ohio App. 4 Dist. Sept. 16, 1999).
The court went on to say that Bad Time is not part of the original sentence, and thus in
this instance, a prisoner's right not be subjected to double jeopardy had been violated. Id.
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III. BAD TIME IS A VIOLATION OF OHIO'S DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The United States was built on the foundation that the
executive, legislative, and judiciary branches would function
independently from one another.68 This idea of separation of powers
has seeped into the structure of some state governments, like Ohio.69
According to the Ohio Constitution, the legislature must not infringe
on the judiciary's right to enforce laws, while the judiciary can not
enact laws. 70 "The principle of separation of powers is embedded in
the constitutional framework of our state government. The Ohio
Constitution applies the principle in defining the nature and scope of
the powers designated to the three branches of the government."
71
Each branch has a limited scope, in order to avoid infringing upon the
powers of the other branches.72 For example, separation of powers
denies the executive branch the right to adjudicate cases. This
responsibility is left to the judiciary.
73
When the Ohio courts were first faced with evaluating the
constitutionality of the Bad Time statute, the Court of Appeals for the
Twelfth District ruled, in Ohio ex rel. Bray v. Russell, that Bad Time
did not violate separation of powers. 74 The court decided that there
was no violation because, as discussed later,75 prisoners do not have
68 See ERWIN CHIMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1 (1997) (explaining that "the division of powers among the branches was designed to
create a system of checks and balances and lessen the possibility of tyrannical rule").
69 See White, 1999 WL 587976, at *3 (stating, "although the Ohio
Constitution does not have a specific clause delineating the concept of the separation of
powers, the doctrine can be implied from the manner in which that document defines the
individual powers of the three branches of the state government").
70 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that "the legislative power of the state
shall be vested in a General Assembly consisting of a senate and house of
representatives").
71 Ohio v. Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 465-6 (1996).
72 id.
73 See generally White, 1999 WL 587976, at *4 (holding that the Bad Time
statute violates the doctrine of separation of powers because a parole board, an executive
agency, infringes on the power of the court to sentence people to serve time in jail).
74 No. CA98-06-068, 1999 WL 778373, at *10-1 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. Nov. 9,
1998).
75 See discussion infra Part IV.
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the same rights as free individuals and are not entitled to all the rights
granted to an accused during the original part of the criminal
prosecution.76 The court focused on the idea that Bad Time is not an
additional sentence, but rather part of the original sentence. 77 Because
the legislature has the power to pass laws defining the length of prison
terms, and the parole board enforces that power, no separation of
powers violation exists. It is within the scope of the Ohio
Legislature to define and fix punishments for prisoners; however, the
legislature does not have the power to take away the role of the
judiciary by enacting a law that simply removes that role.79
By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh District
held, in Samuel White's case, that the Bad Time statute did violate
separation of powers.80 In making this decision, the court explained
the doctrine and cited precedent where the Supreme Court of Ohio
was required to evaluate a situation where the Registrar of Motor
vehicles (a state agency) was given the "power to review and reverse
the judgments of the municipal courts concerning certain driver's
license suspensions."8' The Court held that "pursuant to Section 1,
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, judicial authority can only be
given to 'courts,' not to other types of public entities. ' 2 This means
that the judiciary is the only entity that can perform judicial
functions.83
Then the court held that Bad Time may only be added when
there is a proven criminal offense84, equating this determination to a
criminal prosecution. 85 The State's attorneys argued that according to
76 1998 WL 778373, at *10-11.
77 See id. "The legislature has determined that bad time is prospectively part
of the sentence whenever the offender is to be imprisoned." Id. at *11.
78 See id. The court additionally concluded that, "the power of judges to
sentence is granted by the legislature and can be circumscribed by the legislature." Id. at
*11.
79 See Cleveland v. Scott, 457 N.E.2d 351, 352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1947)).
80 1999 WL 587976, at *5.
8" 28 Ohio St.3d 157 (1986).
82 White, 1999 WL 587976, at *4 (citing South Euclid, 28 Ohio St.2d 157).
83 id.
84 § 2967.11.
85 White, 1999 WL 587976, at *4.
20001 351
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Bray, imposing Bad Time does not conflict with the judiciary; nor
does the imposition require a criminal prosecution because the
extension is part of the original sentence. 86 In response, the White
court held that the legislature is conflicting with the judiciary because
even though the legislature may have the right to define the elements
of a crime, it does not have the right to impose the sentence.87
Furthermore, the court was not persuaded by the notion that Bad Time
is part of the original sentence and thus, does not require judicial
proceedings.88 The Eleventh District ruled that Bad Time "deprives
the judiciary of its exclusive authority to prosecute criminal
offenses."
89
In evaluating the above cases, the Ohio Supreme Court, in a
surprising decision, reversed the Twelfth District and affirmed the
Eleventh District.9" The State argued that the doctrine should only
apply if one branch interferes with another.9' In disagreeing with the
State, the Court discussed that Separation of Powers is fundamental to
a constitutional government.92  The Court found that the statute
"enable[s] the executive branch to prosecute an inmate for a crime, to
determine whether a crime has been committed, and to impose a
sentence for that crime.",93  Those roles are typically left to the
judiciary; as the Court stated, "this is no less than the executive
branch's acting as judge, prosecutor, and jury."
94
The Court based its decision on the fact that the Department of
Rehabilitation and Corrections is an executive agency; meaning that
the governor chooses its members and the legislature enacts the rules
that the department must follow.95 The Department of Rehabilitation
86 id.
87 Id.
88 Id. (stating, "the additional sentence under R.C. 2967.11 can only be
imposed after the prisoner has essentially been found guilty of a new crime").
89 Id. at *5.
90 Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 362.
91 Id. at 361 (relying on State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v.
Cleveland, 661 N.E.2d 187, 193 (1996)).
92 id.
93 Id. at 362.
94 Id.
95 See Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (visited Nov. 13,
1999) at http://www.drc.state.oh.us [hereinafter ODRC].
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chooses the parole board, which consists of twelve, civil service
members.96  The parole board is part of the Department of
Rehabilitation, which makes it an executive agency.97  The Parole
Board is responsible for disciplining prisoners.98 According to the
Ohio Supreme Court, "prison discipline is an exercise of executive
power and nothing in this opinion should be interpreted to suggest
otherwise." 99  When the parole board decides whether Bad Time
should be imposed, it acts as a judicial body by trying and sentencing
the accused;100 thus, violating separation of powers. 1 01
IV. BAD TIME IS A VIOLATION OF A PRISONER'S RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION
The Ohio Supreme Court admirably established that the Bad
Time statute violates the Ohio Constitution, but that is not the only
place where the violations lie. The statute also violates the United
States Constitution by removing a prisoner's right to due process as
defined in the Fifth Amendment, 1°2 which was later extended to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 3  Scholars, for many years,
have argued over the meaning of Due Process and, if Due Process is
required, how much is required.1
0 4
96 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5149.10 (West 1999); see also, Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction: Ohio Parole Board (visited Nov. 13, 1999) at
http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/parboard.htm [hereinafter Parole Board].
97 See BARTOLLAS & BRASWELL, supra note 23, at 543.
98 Id.
99 Bray, 729 N.E.2d at 362.
o See White, 1999 WL 587976, at *4 (holding that the Bad Time statute
allows "certain prison officials and the parole board to perform a judicial act").
101 See id. (stating that "the Supreme Court of Ohio has indicated that the
General Assembly cannot delegate the authority of a court to a state agency").
102 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. ..").
103 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("... nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...").
104 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971) (holding that a high
level of Due Process was required for parole revocation hearings).
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In order to determine if due process is required, the United
States Supreme Court looks to the nature of the deprivation and
whether that deprivation is so serious as to require Due Process.
10 5
The Court stated, in Morrissey v. Brewer, "that due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands."' 6 For example, in Board of Regents v. Roth, the Court
felt that not being rehired to teach at the termination of a one year
contract did not involve an important liberty or property interest
because the teacher's good name and reputation were not at stake.
Further, the Court found that no "stigma or other disability" would be
placed on the teacher's shoulders. 0 7 As a result, a low level of Due
Process was required. 10 8 Conversely, imposing Bad Time takes away
a prisoner's interest in being free from jail and thus, formal
adjudication is warranted.'0 9
105 See id. at 481; see also Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
06 408 U.S. at 481.
107 Id. at 573.
10 Jd. at 564.
109 Unfortunately, prisoners are not being given the opportunity to challenge
the validity of the statute because the Ohio Courts say that most lack standing. See, e.g.,
Spikes, 717 N.E.2d 386 (not allowing a prisoner to contest the legality of the statute
because he did not meet the standing requirements). In a three-part analysis, the Eleventh
District Court of Appeals held, in Spikes, that a prisoner who has not had Bad Time
imposed is not entitled to contest the statute. Id. The Court held that Spikes was not in
the "class against whom the operation of the statute is alleged to have been
unconstitutionally applied." Id. at 388 (citing Palazzi v. Gardner, 512 N.E.2d 971, 977
(Ohio 1987)). The second part of the analysis required an injury in fact. Id. Again, the
Court held that Spikes had not been injured because he had not had Bad Time imposed.
Spikes only had a potential injury, not an actual one. Id. The final step in the standing
analysis was whether the issue is ripe for review. According to the Court, since Spikes
had not had Bad Time imposed, the issue was not ripe. Id. at 388. The dispute with the
Court's main contention is the point of injury. Injury occurs at the time that the prisoner
is informed that Bad Time could be imposed, not the time that it is actually imposed. But
see id. at 388 (concluding that since "he merely claims that because he was sentenced
pursuant to these provisions, he has the potential to be subjected to extended prison time"
the appellant has not been injured and thus, lacks standing to sue). Since the injury
occurs at sentencing, when the prisoner is initially informed of Bad Time, that is the point
where the prisoner should be given the opportunity to contest the constitutionality of the
statute. Id.
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Part A, of this discussion examines the interests that are at
stake when Bad Time is imposed."l 0 Part B begins with why Bad
Time is a punishment for a new and separate offense and then
examines which part of the statute actually deprives the prisoner of his
interests."'1 Part C describes the counter-argument that the statute
does not deprive Due Process by relying on cases that have denied
increased Due Process for prisoners in other similar cases. 112
A. What Interests are at Stake?
For this statute, the major interest at stake is liberty.
Historically, liberty interest meant freedom from restraint.1" 3 Today,
liberty interest encompasses a broader range of rights and
privileges." 4 The Bad Time statute focuses on the deprivation of a
prisoner's liberty by forcing the prisoner to remain incarcerated past
his or her original court-ordered sentence."
5
The time after one has been released from prison is a liberty
interest that deserves to be preserved. 1 6 The offenses that prisoners
are charged with are not part of the crime for which they are serving
time. The offense is new and separate." 7  Thus, if the prisoner is
going to be punished for that crime, then the prisoner is entitled to a
110 See discussion infra Part IV.A (focusing on liberty interests).
111 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
112 See discussion infra Part 1V.C.
113 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 437-8.
1ti See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (defining liberty interest to also include, "the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"
(citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
... See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (discussing the liberty interests of a
parolee whose parole has been terminated).
116 See id. (explaining that it would be a "grievous loss" to a released prisoner
to not have his liberty preserved).
117 See White, 1999 WL 587976, at *8 (Christley, P.J., Concurring). Judge
Christley wrote, "I would note as previously mentioned by the majority, that the term
'violation,' as used in the statute, refers to any act which constitutes a criminal offense
under either laws of Ohio or the United States. It is therefore a new crime and requires an
independent prosecution." Id. Further, he writes, "It is not somehow an extension of the
old crime." Id. See infra Part IV.B.1.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [VOL. XVII
trial by jury, as well as an impartial fact finder. 118 Section 2967.11
does not provide for this, 19 but merely takes away a prisoner's liberty
interest without providing for a trial.12
0
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District, in Bray,
evaluated liberty interests in several prison contexts.' 2' Specifically,
the court evaluated liberty interests in the context of parole denial,
parole revocation and the revocation of Good Time credits. 22 The
court discussed the three levels of liberty interests and the required
due process for each, finally holding that the imposition of Bad Time
only required an intermediate level of Due Process.
23
The lowest level of due process is required for the mere denial
of parole. 124 The amount of Due Process required is notice and an
opportunity to be heard. 25 The Supreme Court ruled that Morrissey
mandated the highest level of due process because it involved parole
revocation. 126 The petitioner in that case was paroled from jail and
then violated his parole seven months later. His parole officer had
him arrested and the petitioner was placed back into prison.127 His
parole was revoked without Due Process. 128 The Court held that,
"revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty
118 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witness against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id. See
also, Nutt, 1999 WL 769951.
119 See § 2967.11 (providing only for an institutional investigator, an RIB,
and a Parole Board to decide the prisoner's fate).
120 Id.
21 1998 WL 778373 (holding the Bad Time Statute constitutional).
122 Id. at *5.
123 Id. at *6.
124 See id at *5 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
125 Id.
126 408 U.S. 471.
117 Id. at 472.
128 Id. at 472-3 (revoking parole after the parole officer's written report was
reviewed by the Parole Board; no hearing was given to Morrissey).
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properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.'
129
The Court found "that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate,
includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on
others."' 130  Thus, the Court found that a high level of process is
required when revoking a person's parole. 13 1 The parolee is entitled
not only to a hearing and an opportunity to be heard, but also a chance
to present and cross-examine witnesses, admit documents, and have a
neutral and detached hearing body.'
32
The intermediate stage is used when Good Time credits are
being revoked. This was the situation in Wolff v. McDonnell, where
the petitioner argued that revoking Good Time credits without proper
due process was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.'
33
The United States Supreme Court ruled that since the statute created
an interest in the credits and acknowledged that removal of them
serves disciplinary purposes, some process is required when the state
wants to revoke the credits for misbehavior. 134  There is a liberty
interest in early parolefrom prison, so the amount of process required
was less than that in Morrissey, 135 but more than that for the denial of
129 Id. at 480 (exploring whether a parolee has the same due process rights as
a citizen).
130 Id. at 482 (finding that a parole is entitled to the same due process rights in
a parole revocation hearing).
131 Id. at 482. The full breadth of process required for parole revocation
includes:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body
such as a traditional parole board, members of which need
not be judicial officers or lawyers; and () a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole." Id. at 489.
.32 See Bray, 1998 WL 778373, at *5 (citing Morrissey).
"3' 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
114 Id. at 557.
' 408 U.S. 471.
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parole. 136 The process required includes advance written notice, an
opportunity to cross examine witnesses and introduce documents, a
written report as to the fact-finder's findings and reasons, as well as
"some evidence" to support the findings. 137
The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District, in Bray,
analogized the intermediate case with section 2967.11, stating,
"petitioner's interest in release at the end of his stated sentence
without 'bad time' is substantially equivalent to the prisoner's interest
in sentences shortened with 'good time'."' 38 The court reached this
conclusion by evaluating how good time affected prisoner's
sentences. Since prisoners could be rewarded with good time, it
caused their sentences to be discretionary, just like imposing bad time
gives the Parole Board discretion in extending a prisoner's term.'
39
The court, in this instance, views Bad Time as part of the original
sentence,not as a punishment for a new and separate offense.14
0
The Twelfth Circuit's reasoning is flawed because, as the
Eleventh Circuit Court stated in White, "the Ohio 'bad time' scheme
under R.C. 2967.11 does not involve the revocation of credit which
would shorten the length of the original sentence imposed by the trial
court. Instead, the latter scheme allows for the extension of a
prisoner's term beyond the limits of the sentence imposed
originally."' 14 1 Bad Time does not create discretion in a prisoner's
sentence. In fact, Bad Time is the punishment for a new and separate
offense. 142 A prisoner is sentenced to the fixed term and then the
136 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-8 (discussing that prisoners are entitled to Due
Process, but revoking Good Time credits does not require that all of the rights of
Morrissey be given).
' 1998 WL 778373, at *7 (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67, and
Superintendent, Mass Corr. Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 451, 455 (1985)). Essentially, the
process requirements not necessary when being stripped of Good Time credits are being
told what evidence is against the prisoner and having a neutral hearing body to decide the
facts. See Wolff 418 U.S. 539.
138 1998 WL 778373, at *6 (reaching this analysis because parole dates are
often discretionary and thus adding time and taking away time are merely part of the
Parole Board's discretion).
139 Id. at *6-*7.
140 id.
141 1999 WL 587976, at *6 (contradicting the Twelfth Circuit relying on the
fact that the time in prison is fixed, and not discretionary, unless extended by Bad Time).
142 id.
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imposition of Bad Time extends the fixed term. 14 3  The court, in
White, concluded that the imposition of Bad Time requires process
identical to that in a criminal prosecution.144
B. How Does the Bad Time Statute Deprive Prisoners of their Liberty
Interests?
The Bad Time Statute deprives a prisoner of his or her
fundamental liberty interests. Bad Time is the punishment for a new
and separate offense. 45 Section 2967.11 dictates that a Parole Board
and several prison officials will find a prisoner guilty of a violation,
rather than a neutral fact-finder. 46 Secondly, the standard of proof
required for the extension of a sentence is clear and convincing
evidence, as opposed to the criminal standard of proof - beyond a
reasonable doubt. 14 7  Finally, the statute deprives a prisoner of a
liberty interest by not allowing representation by counsel through the
duration of the Bad Time process.1
48
1. Bad Time as a Punishment for a New and Separate Offense
R.C. 2967.11 implies that Bad Time is a part of the original
sentence. 149  However, the statute also states that Bad Time is
punishment for a violation committed while in prison. 50 This conflict
has allowed the Ohio Courts to levy punishment without regard to the
prisoner's due process rights. In evaluating Bad Time as part of the
original sentence, the level of process required is substantially less
than the process required for convicting an accused for a new and
141 § 2967.11.
'44 1999 WL 587976, at *6.
145 See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (comparing Bad Time as a punishment
for a new violation and as a punishment which merely extends the original sentence).
146 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (imposing Bad Time is comparable to
sentencing for a criminal prosecution, Due Process mandates a neutral fact finder, such as
a judge).
147 See discussion infra Part IV.B.3 (clear and convincing evidence is not
typically a standard used for criminal prosecutions).
148 See discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
149 § 2967.11 (B) (stating, "As part of a prisoner's sentence..
150 id.
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separate offense. 1 5 1 However, Bad Time cannot be considered part of
the original sentence.
There has been a long debate in the criminal justice system
regarding the level of due process owed to those charged with a
crime.1 52 The latest chapter in thesaga has ended with the United
States Supreme Court declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment
allows the same protections to state crimes as the Fifth Amendment
allows for federal crimes.' 53 Specifically, the Court said that, "any
fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged
in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.' '154 Imposing Bad Time increases the original fixed sentence
thatthe prisoner must serve.' 55 As a result, Bad Time cannot be
imposed without following the basic Due Process requirements.
Therefore, when the violation is alleged, it has to be on the original
indictment and charging instrument for the crime for which the person
is imprisoned.156 Since this is not possible, because the violation has
not occurred yet, the legislature cannot possibly support the idea that
Bad Time is part of the original sentence.' 57 By declaring Bad Time
part of the original sentence, the Ohio legislature has circumscribed
the intentions of the United States Supreme Court.
The Ohio Appellate courts have also rejected the view that
Bad Time is part of the original sentence.' 58 According to the Fourth
Appellate District, "while R.C. 2967.11 attempts to formally make
bad time part of the original sentence, the purpose behind imposing
bad time is to punish new criminal conduct that occurs after the
imposition of the original sentence."' 59 They relied on the report of
the Sentencing Commission stating that prisoners need to be punished
51 See Bray, 1999 WL 778373.
152 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
153 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355 (2000) (citing Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)).
154 Id.
151 § 2967.11.
156 See Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. 2348.
117 See Bray, 1999 WL 778373.
"' See Nutt, 1999 WL 769951.
159 Id. at *6.
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for not following prison rules. 160  The White Court ruled that the
imposition of Bad Time is "more akin to a criminal proceeding."'
61
Consequently, imposing Bad Time requires the process of a criminal
proceeding. 1
62
Bad Time cannot be considered part of the original sentence.
The punishment is for a new and separate offense, which requires a
neutral fact-finder, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and right to
counsel during the Bad Time process.
2. Neutral Fact-finder
The three-tiered system, imposed by the Bad Time statute, at
no time requires that the involvement of the judicial system. Instead,
the system relies on a Parole Board, an Institutional Head similar to a
warden of a prison, and an appointed RIB. 163  However, "it is a
fundamental tenet of due process that the decision to restrict an
individual's freedom can only be made by a neutral magistrate, not by
law enforcement officials whose primary purpose is to place offenders
in jail. ' 164  By its very nature, this statute violates due process. 165
Prisoners are sentenced to spend time in jail for violations of the law.
Under ordinary circumstances, the person would be indicted, tried by
a neutral judge and jury, and subsequently sentenced. 166 The RIB,
Institutional Head and the Parole Board are not neutral parties.'
67
Their primary goals are to maintain order in the prison and help
rehabilitate the prisoners. 168
160 Id.
.61 1999 WL 587976, at *6.
162 id.
163 See generally § 2967.11
'64 White, 1999 WL 587976, at *5 (defining neutral magistrate as a "term to
refer solely to a duly elected or appointed judge of this state." Id. at *9, n.2).
165 See supra Part I.
166 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Spikes, 717 N.E.2d 386
(describing how a criminal prosecution works).
167 See supra text accompanying notes 95-10 1.
168 See BARTOLLAS & BRASWELL, supra note 23, at 479 (discussing the role
of wardens and other prison officials).
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The Adult Parole Authority is a division of the Department of
Rehabilitation. 169  The Parole Board is a subsection of that
authority. 70  Twelve people, appointed by the Department of
Rehabilitation, make up the parole board.1 71 The Institutional Head of
the facility is typically known as the warden.1 72 The Director of the
Department of Rehabilitation chooses the warden. 173  His or her
primary responsibilities are to keep order and peace in the prison, in
addition to appointing the staff members of the prison. Moreover, the
Managing Officer has the entire executive control of the facility. 
74
The RIB is composed of three members of the prison staff,
chosen by the warden, whose primary purpose is to hear the bad time
allegations and rule the discoveries of the institutional investigator.175
This board presides over the hearing where the prisoner presents his
side of the story and tries to refute the charges. At that hearing, the
prisoner is entitled to a staff assistant, who is allowed to help present a
defense. 176  The warden is also responsible for picking the staff
assistant, who is a member of the prison staff.177 The staff assistant
does not help the accused at any other point in the process. 178 When a
Bad Time violation is alleged, an institutional investigator makes
preliminary findings. 179 The warden also chooses the investigator.
1 80
Not once in the adjudication process is the prisoner brought
before a neutral judge. 181 The warden has his or her own agenda,
169 See ODRC, supra note 95.
170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5149.02 (West 1999).
171 § 5149.10.
172 A warden is also known as the Managing Officer of the institution.
171 § 5120.38.
174 Id.
' § 5120-9-091 (A) (4).
176 § 5120-9-091 (F) (providing that the staff assistant helps the inmate
prepare his defense, but does not give legal advice).
177 § 5120-9-091 (A) (5).
178 § 5120-9-091 (B) (4) (b). The prisoner is also allowed to decline the aid
of the staff assistant, but there must be written proof that the prisoner declined help.
§ 5120-9-091 (B) (4) (b).
171 § 5120-9-091 (B).
180 § 5120-9-091 (A) (3).
181 See generally § 2967.11 (providing only for a hearing in front of the
Parole Board).
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specifically keeping order and administering discipline.1 82 Similarly,
the warden's appointees are extensions of the warden, each with the
same goals.' 83 The parole board is often thought of as a neutral body;
however, the White court clearly felt that the Parole Board was not the
proper body to fulfill the role of a neutral magistrate.' 84 Because the
board has been under great scrutiny,' 85 it may not be making the same
unbiased decisions as the Morrissey Court intended.'
86
Even though there is a belief that the procedures mandated by
the Bad Time Statute go through a neutral decision making body, this
is unfounded.18 7 The Department of Rehabilitation chooses the parole
board and the warden. 188 Neither of these figures have the true ability
to be free from bias.' 89 If the level of Due Process were equivalent to
that in Morrissey, 190 then the Parole Board acting as a hearing body
may be enough for Due Process purposes. ' 9' However, as the court in
White declared, "because the employment of the 'bad time' procedure
can result in a loss of liberty, it is similar in nature to a criminal
prosecution."' 192 This similarity requires that the level of Due Process
afforded should be provided to any person charged with a crime.
93
182 See BARTOLLAS & BRASWELL, supra note 23, at 481-85.
183 See supra text accompanying note 175.
184 See 1999 WL 587976, at *5; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (stating
that the traditional parole board is an example of a neutral hearing body).
185 See supra text accompanying notes 34-6.
186 408 U.S. at 489.
187 Compare Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 with White, 1999 WL 587976.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 169-74.
189 But see Bray, 1998 WL 778373, at *11 (holding that it does not matter if
the Parole Board is neutral because it has always been empowered to do many things such
as revoke parole).
9' 408 U.S. at 489.
191 But see Bray, 1998 WL 778373, at *11 (stating that revoking parole is
inherent in the original sentence and thus the Parole Board is sufficiently neutral to fulfill
this role). The major premise of Bray is that Bad Time is a part of the original sentence
and so using the Parole Board as a neutral body is warranted, but as stated earlier, Bad
Time has been declared as a separate sentence for a separate offense. See Nutt, 1999 WL
769951.
192 1999 WL 587976, at *4.
19' U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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3. The clear and convincing evidence standard is low
In order to imposeBad Time, the Parole Board and the warden
must determine if there is clear and convincing evidence to support
the allegation.194 However, since the process of imposing Bad Time is
equivalent to a criminal conviction, the burden of proof should be
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 95 There are three standards of proof:
preponderance of the evidence, which is typically used in civil cases;
clear and convincing evidence, typically used in some civil cases or in
quasi-criminal cases; and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, used in
criminal cases.'
96
The preponderance of the evidence standard is the lowest
standard and is inapplicable to criminal cases. 197 The next standard is
clear and convincing evidence, the standard used in the Bad Time
statute.1 98 The United States Supreme Court, in Addington v. Texas,
characterized this standard stating, ".... the interests at stake in those
[quasi-criminal] cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere
loss of money."' 199 Furthermore, the Court said that this is the "
standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests
in various civil cases., 20 0 The Court never implies that this standard
should be used for a criminal conviction.20'
The highest standard of proof is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.20 2 In fact, there are "... expressions in many opinions of [the
Supreme] Court to indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of
a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
'9' § 2967.11.
195 See White, 1999 WL 587976, at *7 (giving as one of the reasons that the
Bad Time statute violates due process is "that the statute states that a finding of a
violation need only be established by clear and convincing evidence, as compared to
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt").
196 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
1 See id.
198 § 2967.11.
'99 441 U.S. at 424.
200 Id.
201 See id.; see also, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (stating that only
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be used for criminal convictions).
202 See id; see also, 441 U.S. at 423-4.
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required., 20 3 Such a high standard is necessary because liberty is one
of the basic fundamental rights,2 °4 and taking away that liberty
requires a high level of due process.20 5 The Court did not want to run
the risk of imprisoning someone who is not actually guilty.
"Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of
every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a
crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. ',26 The liberty
interests of a prisoner in danger of having a Bad Time "conviction" is
the same as for a person in danger of being convicted of any other
crime. Thus, Bad Time should only be imposed if the prison can
uphold the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard.20 7
To further show why proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is preferable, follow the analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge. °8
Here, the United States Supreme Court stated that to determine
whether due process is required involves a consideration of several
factors. These factors are the private interest, the "risk of erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards" and the Government's interest.
20 9
As noted earlier, the prisoner's interest involves the "grievous
loss" of liberty in forcing him or her to remain incarcerated after the
original sentence. 210  By allowing the mere standard of clear and
convincing evidence to determine if a prisoner will remain in jail past
the original sentence, there is a clear risk of erroneous deprivation of
that liberty. 21 ' The government's interests are the same as those noted
earlier. Specifically, there is the desire of the warden and other prison
officials to keep order in the prison and to rehabilitate the prisoners.212
20 3 
d. at 361.
204 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
205 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471.
206 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
207 White, 1999 WL 587976, at *7 (holding that yet another reason why this
statute is unconstitutional is because the standard of proof is only clear and convincing
evidence).
208 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
209 See id. at 335.
210 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482; also see, supra Part IVA.
21, See Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
212 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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This interest is preserved even if Bad Time is not imposed. As the
court stated in White, " . . our decision in this case should not be
interpreted as depriving prison officials of the ability to discipline
prisoners for bad behavior. Obviously, the ability to discipline is
necessary so that the prison officials can maintain order in the
facility." 213 The court went further stating, ". . . there are other'types
of sanctions which prison officials can readily employ to achieve this
goal. 214
The prisoner's liberty interest and the risk of depriving that
interest are much greater than the interests of the Government. By
maintaining the clear and convincing evidence standard, the Ohio
statute deprives the prisoner of his or her fundamental freedom and
creates a risk too great to be denied.215 Section 2967.11 deprives a
prisoner of Due Process rights by setting the standard of proof too
low.
4. The Bad Time Statute Does Not Provide the Accused the Right to
Representation by Counsel
Section 5120-9-091 of Ohio's Administrative Code merely
authorizes a prisoner to seek the aid of an internal staff assistant to
help with the defense.2 16 The statute does not indicate that this staff
member must be legally trained, nor does the statute state that a
prisoner is entitled to a lawyer when defending a Bad Time action.
217
Many courts have refused to comment on, or have just simply denied
prisoners the right to representation by counsel in parole revocation
hearings and Good Time credit revocation hearings. 218 However, as
noted earlier, those types of hearings fundamentally require less due
process than the imposition of Bad Time.
2 19
213 1999 WL 587976, at *6.
2141id.
215 See supra, text accompanying notes 210-4.
216 § 5120-9-091 (A) (5) (stating that "an inmate charged with a bad time
violation shall have the right to be assisted in presenting his defense at the hearing before
the rules infraction board by a staff member designated by the warden for that purpose").
217 See § 5120-9-091; also see § 2967.11.
218 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471; see also Wolff 418 U.S. 539.
219 See supra, text accompanying notes 121-37.
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In Morrissey, where the parolee had his parole revoked, the
Court declined to decide whether the prisoner had a right to
counsel.220 The Court said, "[w]e do not reach or decide the question
whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or
to appointed counsel if he is indigent." 221 In the concurrence, Justice
Brennan cited Goldberg v. Kelly,222 stating that the defendant,
prisoner "must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. 223
Justice Brennan and Marshall indicate that Due Process allows for the
prisoner to retain counsel.224
The Wolff court decided that less Due Process was required
for revoking Good Times credits than for revoking parole.2 25 As a
result, the Court held that " . . . the insertion of counsel into the
disciplinary process would inevitably give the proceedings a more
adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further
correctional goals. 226 In reaching this decision, the Court cited the
reasoning of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 227 which stated that having
attorney's represent inmates in revocation hearings, like the one in
Wolff, will turn the process into something more like a court
proceeding rather than a parole proceeding; thus, eroding the Parole
Board's rehabilitation goals.228 Although the Court generally stated
that allowing the retention of counsel is not a Due Process right, it did
220 See 408 U.S. at 489.
221 Id.
222 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that taking away a person's government
benefits requires proper Due Process).
223 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 491 (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270).
224 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 491 (noting further that "the only question
open under our precedents is whether counsel must be furnished the parolee if he is
indigent").
225 418 U.S. 539.
226 Id. at 570. The court went on to say that "there would also be delay and
very practical problems in providing counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place
where hearings are to be held. At this stage of the development of these procedures we
are not prepared to hold that inmates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel
in disciplinary proceedings." Id.
227 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
228 Specifically, the court said "the role of the hearing body itself... may
become more akin to that of a judge at a trial, and less attuned to the rehabilitative needs
of the individual probationer or parolee." See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 569-70 (quoting
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 787-8).
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say that " . . . where an illiterate inmate is involved ... or where the
complexity of the issue makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able
to collect and present evidence necessary for an adequate
comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a
fellow inmate."229 The Court went on, .... or if that is forbidden, to
have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from
a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff., 230 Again, the
court has refused to declare, that in order to maintain Due Process
rights, retaining counsel is required.
Even the White court, the only court to hold the statute
unconstitutional, did not address the issue of retaining counsel. 3
However, that court did say that imposing Bad Time was a process
equivalent to a criminal prosecution.232 As such, a prisoner is allowed
to retain counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 233 Thus, in order to ensure that a prisoner retains
Due Process rights, he or she should be allowed to retain an
attorney.234 Neither section 2967.11, nor section 5120-9-091 gives the
prisoner the right to retain counsel; instead, the statutes allow the
prisoner to obtain the aid of prison staff, who very well may be
uneducated about the law.235
C. What are the Counter-Arguments?
Since the inception of section 2967.11, most people argue that
the statute gives prisoners their full Due Process rights.236 In fact,
there has only been one case and one court that declared the statute
unconstitutional.237 By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
229 See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570.
230 Id.
231 See White, 1999 WL 587976.
232 Id. at *6.
233 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
234 Id.; Ohio CONST. art. 1, § 10 (stating, "in any trial, in any court, the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel").
23 § 5120-9-091(B)(4)(b).
236 See Bray, 1998 WL 778373, at *9 (holding "that bad time is constitutional
under the appropriate due process analysis").
237 See generally White, 1999 WL 587976.
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District, in Bray, held that the statute was not only constitutional, but
that it did not deny prisoners their Due Process rights.
238
The Bray court argued that the prisoner's liberty interests were
only conditional because he had been sentenced in contemplation that
Bad Time would be imposed. 239 This means that since the prisoner's
liberty interests were already diminished, then he or she is not entitled
to the full Due Process requirements of a free person. 240  However,
simply because the prisoner is not free when the violation occurs, does
not mean that he or she would not suffer a "grievous loss" by
extending the sentence.241 In concluding that a prisoner has only
conditional liberty interests, the Bray court decided that the only
process required was that found in Wolff.2 4 2 This level of due process
is not enough to ensure that a prisoner is fairly tried and sentenced,
because imposing Bad Time is not just a way to discipline prisoners, it
is a way to take away their fundamental rights of Due Process.2 43
CONCLUSION
Ohio's Criminal Justice System has changed dramatically over
the past 100 years, from an indeterminate system, to a determinate
one, and finally to a system that incorporates both.244  The Ohio
legislators have attempted to impose a system where prisoners know
that when they go to jail, they will be there for their entire term.2 45
In an effort to further ensure that prisoners will fulfill their
entire sentences, and to punish prisoners for the criminal activity
during incarceration, the Ohio legislature put together the Bad Time
238 1998 WL 778373, at *9.
239 Id. at *4.
240 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
241 See id. at 482 (holding that a parolee has a great deal of liberty interest in
his parole). As noted earlier, imposing Bad Time involves an even greater liberty interest
than revoking parole. See supra text accompanying notes 112-39.
242 1998 WL 778373, at *9.
243 See generally White, 1999 WL 587976 (holding the Bad Time statute
unconstitutional because it deprives prisoners of their due process rights).
244 See discussion supra Part I.
245 See Lore, supra note 12, at IA.
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statute.246 This statute increases the amount of time that a prisoner
will spend in jail based on violations committed while in jail.
Unfortunately, Ohio's efforts have served to violate its own notions of
the doctrine of separation of powers. 247 Moreover, the Bad Time
statute deprives prisoners of some of their constitutionally guaranteed
rights, which are included in the basic right to Due Process of the
law.248 Due Process requires that a prisoner be tried in front of a
neutral magistrate, 249 the right to an attorney,250 and having the burden
of proof as proof beyond a reasonable doubt,251 especially since Bad
Time is the punishment for a new and separate offense.
252
Even though imposing Bad Time may be a good deterrence of
criminal activity in prison, it should not be implemented because it
simply violates a prisoner's rights. There are many other methods of
disciplining prisoners that do not infringe on their fundamental
rights.253 As the concurring opinion in White said, "[h]owever well
intentioned the legislature may have been, it opened Pandora's box
with this piece of legislation. If we were to allow this challenge to go
unanswered, we would, in effect, be allowing the destruction of the
sole barrier which protects the public from an overzealous
government-the Constitution. 254  Before times get worse for the
affected prisoners, Bad Time should be repealed.
Stephanie D. Weaver
246 § 2967.11.
247 See discussion supra Part 111.
248 See discussion supra Part IV.
249 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
250 See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
251 See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
252 See discussion supra Part IV.B.I.
253 See White, 1999 WL 587976, *9 (Christley, J., concurring).
254 id.
